A Statistical Overview on Data Privacy by Liu, Fang
A STATISTICAL OVERVIEW ON DATA PRIVACY ↑ 
FANG LIU, PH. D.* 
ABSTRACT 
The eruption of big data with the increasing collection and processing of vast volumes and variety of data have 
led to breakthrough discoveries and innovation in science, engineering, medicine, commerce, criminal justice, and 
national security that would not have been possible in the past.  While there are many benefits to the collection and 
usage of big data, there are also growing concerns among the general public on what personal information is collected 
and how it is used.  In addition to legal policies and regulations, technological tools and statistical strategies also exist 
to promote and safeguard individual privacy, while releasing and sharing useful population-level information.  In this 
overview, I introduce some of these approaches, as well as the existing challenges and opportunities in statistical data 
privacy research and applications to better meet the practical needs of privacy protection and information sharing.  
INTRODUCTION 
Today, digitization touches every part of our lives, affecting how we work and live.  Emerging technologies, 
such as artificial intelligence, high performance computing, cloud storage, and computing, help to accelerate the digital 
transformation.  As technology capabilities continue to expand, there is also a growing concern in the public around 
increasing collection, storage, dissemination, and processing of personal information.  According to the Pew Research 
Center, roughly sixty percent of U.S. adults do not think it is possible to go through daily life without their personal 
data collected by either companies or the government, and over eighty percent are concerned about what is being done 
with their data.1 
The issue of data privacy is not new and can be dated back to 1890, when two U.S. lawyers, Samuel D. Warren 
and Louis D. Brandeis, wrote The Right to Privacy to declare a right to privacy in the United States.2  Fast forward to 
today, not only are there legal policies and regulations, but also administrative controls, and computer and statistical 
strategies to promote and safeguard privacy.  For example, the European Union enforced the implementation of the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on May 25, 2018; the U.S. privacy laws Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) and Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) protect personal information of 
patients since 1996 and of children under thirteen since 1998, respectively; and China has recently adopted the 
National Standard of Information Security Technology—Personal Information Security Specification.3  Technology 
and methodologies have also been in development to protect privacy, such as access control (e.g., password and 
electronic gatekeepers for remote access to computer databases), destruction (deletion of the data that are no longer 
needed), digital passport, data anonymization and pseudonymization, and encryption, among others.  
Anonymization and pseudonymization relate the most to the statistical strategies for protecting privacy and are 
often regarded as a must when performing scientific or statistical research.  Specifically, anonymization and 
pseudonymization consist of stripping individual identifying information or injecting noises into the original data 
before releasing the data and information to the public.  This greatly reduces the identification risk of individuals and 
the disclosure risk of attribute information.  On the other hand, due to the perturbation used in the data to achieve 
anonymization and pseudonymization, there will be unavoidable information loss and the released information to the 
public will not be as accurate or precise as the original information.  Ideally, a data perturbation approach should 
maximize the protection of respondents in a data set, while minimizing the information loss due to the perturbation.  
However, in reality, the more protection there is, the less useful the released data are.  Figure 1 illustrates how 
information starts to get lost and privacy increases as more noises and perturbations are injected into the original data, 
which are the images of human faces.  An optimal or near-optimal balance between the two extremes—maximal 
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information and no privacy for individuals versus zero information and maximal privacy for individuals—is often the 
goal when developing strategies for data release.   
 
Figure 1: Data utility decreases and privacy increases as perturbation increases  
   
(a) Original data (clockwise 
from upper left: photos by 
Houcine Ncib,  Rene Porter, Re 
Stacks, and Anastasiya Pavlova 
on unsplash.com) 
(b) Perturbed data with some 
preservation of original  
information 
(c) Extremely perturbed data that 
are almost useless 
In what follows, I will first provide an overview on the assessment of privacy risk in released data in Section I, 
and then present some approaches in Section II to assess utility of the data if they are processed for privacy protection 
purposes before being released to the public.  I will use Section III to introduce some traditional and state-of-the-art 
methods and techniques for perturbing the original data to lower the privacy risk while maintaining some level of 
utility upon release.  Discussions and concluding remarks are provided in Section IV. 
I. PRIVACY RISK MEASUREMENT 
One of the research topics in data privacy is to measure the privacy risk level in the released data and whether 
the individual privacy can be safeguarded when releasing information.  There are two main types of privacy risk: re-
identification risk and attribute disclosure risk.  The former occurs when a data intruder is able to recognize an 
individual from the released data, and the latter refers to when a data intruder can figure out the value on an attribute 
of his target, even without precisely identifying the records from the released data.  
Privacy risk measures can be roughly grouped in two categories: relative privacy risk measures and absolute 
privacy risk measures.4  The former is also referred to by many as “differential privacy” (DP)5 or “formal privacy”.6  
In relative privacy risk measures, there is a pre-set privacy parameter that upper bounds the additional leakage of 
privacy with each release of information.  Data perturbation mechanisms build in the framework of DP and are 
designed to achieve the pre-specified privacy level.  Since the privacy risk control is guaranteed upfront, there is often 
no need to perform a post-hoc assessment of the privacy risk in the released perturbed data, and one may focus on 
achieving the highest utility possible for the released information when developing a differentially private perturbation 
mechanism.  In contrast, absolute privacy risk measures focus on quantifying the totality of the privacy risk in released 
data.  In the rest of this Section, I will first examine the absolute privacy risk, and then present the DP concept.  
I.1. Absolute Privacy Risk 
I.1.1.  k-Anonymity, 𝑙𝑙-Diversity, and 𝑡𝑡-Closeness  
The concept of k-anonymity was first introduced by Samarati and Sweeney in 1998.7  A release of data is said 
to have the k-anonymity property if the information for each person contained in the release cannot be distinguished 
from at least 𝑘𝑘 − 1 individuals in the released data.  For example, if 𝑘𝑘 = 2, then there is no unique record in the 
released data and each record looks the same to at least one other records.  On the other hand, achieving k-anonymity 
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exactly can be computationally infeasible when the number of attributes are large; but approximate methods often 
yield effective results.8  Though k-anonymity is a promising concept for privacy protection, data of k-anonymity are 
still susceptible to many attacks, especially when data attackers possess some background knowledge.9  In addition, k-
anonymity does not include any randomization, attackers can still make inferences that may harm individuals.  Finally, 
it is not effective for high-dimensional data (there are many attributes in the data, or the so-called “large-𝑝𝑝” problem 
in statistics).  
The 𝑙𝑙-diversity is an extension of the k-anonymity model.10  The l-diversity model handles some of the 
weaknesses of k-anonymity.  For example, when the sensitive values within a group are homogenous, the l-diversity 
model promotes the intra-group diversity on a sensitive attribute.  Instead of every individual having the same value 
on the attribute, there are at least l ”well represented” values for the sensitive attribute.11  “Well represented” in this 
context can be interpreted in three ways: (1) at least 𝑙𝑙 distinct values; (2) entropy 𝑙𝑙-diversity; or (3) recursive (𝑐𝑐 − 𝑙𝑙)-
diversity that ensures that the most common value does not appear too often while less-common values are ensured to 
not appear too infrequently.  Similar to the 𝑘𝑘-anonymity, the 𝑙𝑙-diversity model does not scale well with the number of 
attributes.  In addition, it might still leak sensitive information when the “diversity” is defined at a granular level and 
those diverse values may still be semantically close.  For example, a data intruder can still conclude an individual has 
a stomach disease if a data set to which the individual belongs only lists three different stomach diseases.  The 𝑡𝑡-
closeness is a further refinement of the l-diversity that deals with some of its drawbacks.12  The threshold t gives an 
upper bound on the difference between the distributions of the sensitive attribute values within an anonymized group 
as compared to the global distribution of values for numeric attributes.13 
I.1.2.  Other Approaches  
All the three privacy risk concepts discussed in Section I.1.1 have pre-specified privacy parameters.  Once the 
parameters are set, a protocol or an algorithm is developed and implemented to achieve the pre-set privacy level for 
the released data; and there is often no need for further privacy risk assessment after the data are released.  Besides 
the parameterized privacy risk models, there exist other privacy risk assessment approaches that are not necessarily 
associated with a privacy parameter, but rather aim at quantifying re-identification risk or attribute disclosure risk in 
the released data, often by imposing assumptions on the external knowledge and behaviors of data intruders.  These 
approaches can be regarded as the post-hoc privacy risk assessment as they are carried out upon receiving the data 
and depend on the approaches used to perform the risk assessment, the assumptions imposed, and sometimes the type 
of released data.  
One of these approaches is through the record-linkage technique that links the released data with external 
knowledge that a data intruder possesses to re-identify his target.  Depending on the assumption on the external 
knowledge, the re-identification risk varies.  In that sense, the approach is, to a degree, ad-hoc and non-robust.  While 
one can always adopt the worst-case scenario approach by assuming the intruder has maximal external knowledge he 
could use to link to the released data, the meaning of “worst-case” and its supposed guarantee only pertain to the status 
quo and is not future-proof.  In other words, the “worst-case” scenarios may no longer hold if the data intruder obtains 
more information in the future, and the data perturbation methods built upon it would no longer maintain the originally 
desired confidentiality levels.  
The other privacy risk approach quantifies the probability that a sample unique is also a population unique.  A 
“sample unique” refers to the case that there is only one individual in the sample data that possesses certain values of 
the attributes; and a “population unique” means there is only one individual in the population that possesses certain 
values of the attributes.  When a sample unique is a population unique, the re-identification risk of that individual is 
maximal.  If the data intruder knows his target is in the released data and has information on all the pseudo-identifiers 
for his target, and if that target is a sample unique, then that target will be identified even if the target is not a population 
unique. Therefore, the existence of sample unique per se imposes privacy risk.  The good news is that while every 
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individual in the population is unique, sample data are finite in terms of the number of attributes.  Therefore, it is likely 
that some individuals share the same set of attribute values in the sample, especially when the sample size (the total 
number of individuals) is large.   
For the approaches without formal privacy parameters but focusing on the post-hoc privacy risk assessment, the 
privacy risk will vary by perturbation mechanisms.  Some approaches will lead to better privacy protection than the 
others per either the record-linkage assessment, the population unique probability quantification, or other risk 
assessment metrics.  In other words, not only will different approaches lead to different utility for the perturbed data, 
but also their privacy guarantees are different.  This will make the comparison of perturbation approaches harder than 
in the setting of formal privacy, where every perturbation approach is under the same privacy guarantee, and those 
that offer higher utility are preferred.  
I.2. Differential Privacy  
Differential privacy (DP), a concept popularized in the theoretical computer science community,14 provides 
strong privacy guarantee in mathematical terms without making assumptions about the background knowledge of data 
intruders.  It is also immune to post-processing and is future-proof, meaning the achieved privacy level for the 
individuals in the released data will remain the same regardless of what post-processing procedure is applied to the 
data and what future information the data intruder will have about his target.  DP is claimed to provably thwart any 
privacy attack, including the re-identification and attribute disclosure risks.15  DP is the state-of-the-art concept in data 
privacy research and has also started to influence how practitioners (industry and government) collect and release 
data. In what follows, I will provide more details on the concept of DP. 
I.2.1.  The Classical Definition 
In brief, an 𝜖𝜖-differentially private mechanism perturbs a statistic (a quantity calculated from a data set) to satisfy 
the following condition: when the statistic is calculated from two neighboring data sets that differ by one record, the 
ratio of the probabilities of that statistic taking the same value (any) based on the two sets, is bounded between 
(𝑒𝑒−𝜖𝜖 , 𝑒𝑒𝜖𝜖).  The perturbed statistic via an 𝜖𝜖-differentially private mechanism is often referred to as the sanitized statistic.  
In layman’s terms, DP means that the chance an individual will be identified based on the sanitized statistic is low if 
𝜖𝜖 is small since the statistic would be about the same with or without the individual in the database.  Inversely, if 𝜖𝜖 is 
larger, then the sanitized statistic will be different when an individual is absent or present in the data, leading to a 
higher chance of that individual being identified and his attribute values being disclosed from the released sanitized 
results.  
To achieve 𝜖𝜖-DP, noises will be injected to the original statistics to obtain sanitized statistics to release to the 
public.  The higher the requirement on privacy, the smaller the 𝜖𝜖, the more noises are needed to perturb the original 
results to achieve 𝜖𝜖-DP, and the less useful the released sanitized results will be.  The desire to achieve a higher level 
of utility has motivated the work on relaxing the original DP definition, such as the approximate differential privacy,16 
the probabilistic differential privacy,17 the random differential privacy,18 and the concentrated differential privacy.19  
For all these relaxed versions of the classical DP, there is at least one more parameter in addition to 𝜖𝜖 that governs the 
amount of relaxation.  
As can be observed from the discussion above, 𝜖𝜖 is a critical parameter when it comes to the practical 
implementation, as it quantifies the privacy level of the sanitized results and affects the usefulness of the released 
information.  Regarding what value of 𝜖𝜖  is appropriate or acceptable for practical use, Dwork states that the choice 
of 𝜖𝜖 is a social question but suggests small values like 0.01, 0.1, or even as large as ln2 or ln3.20  Lee and Clifton 
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suggest a formula to calculate 𝜖𝜖 if the goal is to hide any individual’s presence (or absence) in the database.21  Abowd 
and Schmutte address the question from the economic perspective by accounting for the public-good properties of 
privacy loss and data utility, and define the optimal choice of 𝜖𝜖 by formulating a social planner’s problem.22  In the 
numerical examples published in the literature on DP, many examine a range of 𝜖𝜖, but often curb the maximum 𝜖𝜖 at 
1.23  An application of DP to the U.S. Census Bureau’s OnTheMap data (commuting patterns of the U.S. population) 
uses (𝜖𝜖 = 8.6, 𝛿𝛿 = 10−5)-probabilistic DP.  In summary, there are many factors that affect the choice of 𝜖𝜖—the social 
perception of privacy, the sensitivity level of the information to be released, and the desired utility, among others.  The 
choice of 𝜖𝜖 is still an active research area and might take some time before a consensus, if possible, can be reached.  
I.2.2.  Extension of Classical Differential Privacy  
Local Differential Privacy 
One of the population extensions of the classical DP is the so-called local DP.24  Formally, local DP bounds the 
likelihood ratio of obtaining the same response through a randomization mechanism, when the true response takes any 
two different values, below 𝑒𝑒𝜖𝜖.  In other words, it suggests that the likelihood that a subject produces a randomized 
response is close to a constant (how close depends on the value of 𝜖𝜖) regardless what his true response is.  The concept 
of local DP captures a type of plausible deniability, which means people have the ability to deny knowledge because 
of a lack of evidence that can confirm their participation, even if they were personally involved in, or at least willfully 
ignorant of, the actions.25  
Randomized response, a mechanism proposed in 1965 for data collection with privacy protection,26 can be 
regarded as a form of the local DP.  There are several ways to conduct randomized response.  For example, suppose a 
subject is asked a sensitive and private question, say, on whether he had ever stolen.  Before answering the question, 
the subject is instructed to flip a coin, and answer truthfully if the coin lands on tails or flip a second coin if it lands 
on heads.  If the second coin comes up heads, then the subject is to answer “Yes,” or answer “No” if lands on tails.  If 
the coin is unbiased and the true population proportion of ever stealing is 𝜃𝜃, then the expected probability of getting a 
“Yes” response via randomized response is 0.25 +  0.50 𝜃𝜃 and that of getting a “No” response is 0.25 +  0.50(1 − 𝜃𝜃).  Interpreted in the context of local DP, it means that if the subject’s response is “Yes,” then he can claim that is 
because the coin landed heads up and his privacy is protected.  It is easy to prove that the likelihood ratio of having a 
“Yes” response through the two-time coin flipping randomized response mechanism when the true response is “Yes” 
versus when the true response is “No” is bounded below 3 (that is, 𝜖𝜖 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (3)).  Data obtained through the randomized 
response mechanism still allow us to find an unbiased estimate of 𝜃𝜃, which is a population-level parameter of interest, 
even without knowing the true response from each subject or who answers the questions truthfully.  
Location Privacy with Geo-Indistinguishability 
It is very common nowadays that untrusted servers collect massive information on users’ location with the 
increased popularity of mobile devices.  Location information is sensitive; no one wants to be followed or “spied on” 
(even virtually), especially by someone that they do not trust or know.  Andrés et al. propose the concept of geo-
indistinguishability, a formal notion of location privacy that extends the classical DP framework.27  Geo-
indistinguishability formalizes the intuitive notion that the more precise the location information is about the user, the 
more sensitive that information is and the more privacy concern there is for the user.  The precision of the location 
information and the privacy protection level can be characterized by the radius 𝑟𝑟 of the neighborhood around the user’s 
true location–the smaller 𝑟𝑟 is, the less privacy protection there is.  Geo-indistinguishability states that the user enjoys (𝜖𝜖 × 𝑟𝑟)-privacy, if the randomization mechanism draws a random location from the neighborhood of radius 𝑟𝑟 around 
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the true location.  𝜖𝜖 corresponds to the level of privacy for one unit of distance, and  𝜖𝜖 × 𝑟𝑟 quantifies the overall privacy 
level for the randomized mechanism.  Figure 2 shows that the privacy protection level increases as the radius 𝑟𝑟 of the 
neighborhood around the user’s true location increases. 
 
Figure 2: Privacy protection level increases with the radius of the neighborhood around the user’s true location per geo-
indistinguishability28 
I.2.3.  Differential Privacy in Practice 
Given the attractive mathematical properties of DP, software and web-based interfaces that collect data and 
release statistics and information with DP have been developed.  For example, RescueDP29 is an online aggregate 
monitoring scheme that publishes real-time population statistics on spatial-temporal, crowd-sourced data from mobile 
phone users with DP.30  PSI (𝛹𝛹), 31 developed by the Harvard Privacy Tool Project, implements a system for 
generating and releasing differentially private queries and statistical models, and is integrated with the Dataverse 
repository,32 an open source web application to share, cite, explore, and analyze research data.33  Big companies such 
as Uber, IBM, and Google have released open-sourced differential privacy libraries at GitHub for experimenting and 
developing DP applications.34  The U.S. Census Bureau is pushing the implementation of DP for releasing the 2020 
Decennial Census and will extend it to the American Community Survey in the future.35 
Google, Apple, and other companies have applied local DP to collect users’ data.  Google employs Randomized 
Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response (RAPPOR), an end-user client software to collect Chrome 
browser data for crowd-sourcing statistics, where local DP is ensured by implementing two types of randomized 
responses.36  Figure 3 depicts the system architecture used by Apple for data collection with DP.  The system consists 
of device-side and server-side data processing.37  The local DP is implemented in two places in this system—when 
collecting the raw data (the privatization stage) and when the restricted-access server further processes and aggregates 
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data to generate histograms.  Uber took a different route and developed an approximate DP method on practical private 
SQL queries instead of using local DP. 
 
Figure 3: The system architecture for differentially private data collection and processing in Apple, Inc. (modified from the 
Apple Machine Learning Journal38) 
II. MEASUREMENT OF DATA UTILITY 
It is critical to evaluate the utility of the data perturbed for privacy protection reasons before releasing them to 
the public.  If there is too much perturbation, it might render the data useless for research or practical use.  To evaluate 
the balance between privacy protection and data utility, frameworks and approaches for efficiently and accurately 
assessing utility are needed.  In this section, I provide an overview on some existing theoretical and methodological 
approaches for assessing the data utility.  Some approaches focus on a single or a limited set of statistics and query 
results, while others are more ambitious and aim to assess the overall utility of a released data set. 
If the released information contains a finite set of query results or statistics (e.g., histograms, cross-tabulations, 
means, model parameter estimates, predictions), we may examine the distance between the perturbed statistics and 
the original statistics, by using the so-called “𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝 distance”.  Some common choices of 𝑝𝑝 is 1, 2, and ∞.  When 𝑝𝑝 = 1, 
it becomes the 𝑙𝑙1 distance (summed absolute differences between the original and perturbed sets); when 𝑝𝑝 = 2, it 
becomes the 𝑙𝑙2 distance (summed squared differences between the two sets).  When 𝑝𝑝 = ∞, it becomes the 𝑙𝑙∞ distance 
(the maximum absolute distance between two sets).  The smaller the distance, the more similar the perturbed set is to 
the original set, and the more original information are preserved per that metric.  Mean squared error (MSE) is another 
commonly-used metric to assess the utility of the released data.  Compared to the 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝 distance, MSE captures both the 
distance and the variability (stability) of the perturbed results.   
These utility measures have been employed for utility analysis not only in empirical studies with real-life and 
simulated data, but also theoretically.  Some of the notable theoretical work focuses on bounding the  𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝 distance, or 
bounding with a high probability the so-called “excess risk”, often defined as the expected 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝 distance between the 
perturbed statistics and the statistics that would be obtained assuming an infinite amount of information.  Often times, 
the bounds are functions of the sample size (or sample complexity), the privacy parameters (such as 𝜖𝜖 in the DP 
framework), and some accuracy parameter.  With the functional relationships, one can also obtain a lower bound on 
the sample size given a desired accuracy level with a high probability.39   
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While it is desirable to preserve as much original sample information as possible, the objectives for sharing and 
releasing data in many cases are to make inferences on the underlying population parameters where the original data 
are sampled.  In others words, if the released data can preserve well the population-level information, then it should 
be sufficient from a data utility perspective.  It has been shown that perturbation, if done appropriately, can help to 
increase the stability and robustness of the estimates for population parameters, boost the accuracy of predictions, and 
improve the generalizability of models or parameters learned from training the original data.  Therefore, rather than 
merely focusing on preserving the original sample information, which contains sampling variability and in some cases 
is harder to achieve, one could instead examine the utility from a statistical inference perspective.  For example, in the 
case of releasing the result for statistical hypothesis testing, rather than focusing on preserving as much as possible 
the original test statistic value, one may preserve the conclusion for hypothesis testing with a high probability of not 
violating privacy, which is supposedly an easier task.  In the case of releasing parameter estimation (e.g., means or 
proportions), in addition to releasing a private parameter estimate, one may consider releasing a private uncertainty 
measurement along with that parameter estimate.  If the private confidence interval based on the private point and 
uncertainty estimates provides close-to-nominal coverage or has a significant overlap with the original confidence 
interval, then the population-level information might be well-preserved.  In summary, shifting the focus to preserving 
the population-level information will help to alleviate the tension between privacy protection and the data utility as 
the utility is not about retrieving the individual information in the original data, which is in direct conflict with privacy 
protection, but rather about preserving population-level information, which is more of an indirect conflict with privacy 
protection.  As a side benefit, the private inferences might offer better generalizability than the inferences based on 
the original data, which are more susceptible to overfitting.  Figure 4 shows a pictorial representation of the idea.  The 
perturbed data deviates from the original sample data.  The deviation scenarios in (a) and (b) are acceptable given that 
the perturbed data still represent the population-level information well, whereas scenario (c) is a bad case where the 
perturbed data contain biased information about the target population. 
 
Figure 4: Relationship between the original data, the perturbed data, and the  
underlying population where the original data are sampled 
(a) (b) (c) 
 
The above-discussed utility assessment focuses on assessing the information preservation on a finite set of 
statistics.  Sometimes, the released information is a whole data set, which is often referred to as the “synthetic data” 
or “surrogate data” (see Section III for more discussion).  In this case, it would be nice to have a rather comprehensive 
metric that shows the general utility of the release data.  Strictly speaking, there is no universal data utility measure, 
unless strong assumptions are made about the distributions of the data.  That said, there are some approaches that try 
to fulfil the goal; and one of the ideas is the propensity-score utility measures, which aim at quantifying the general 
utility of the synthetic data by measuring their similarity with the original data, regardless the dimensionality of the 
data.  For these approaches, the synthetic data and original data are first combined.  A statistical model is then built 
on the combined data, and the propensity score (the likelihood) of an observation belonging to the synthetic (or the 
original) data is estimated.  There exist several approaches that formulate a single metric based on the property scores 
that summarizes the similarity between the synthetic and original data.40  If the synthetic data preserve the original 
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information well, then the observations from the synthetic and original data sets are indistinguishable, and the metric 
should reflect that.  All the approaches focus on preserving the original sample data rather than the population-level 
information.  For example, the synthetic data in scenarios (a) and (b) in Figure 4 are regarded as acceptable from a 
population-information preservation perspective but might be labelled as “unacceptable” per one of the propensity-
score based approaches, especially scenario (b).  Further research is warranted and better approaches for evaluating 
the general utility of the synthetic data are needed. 
III. PERTURBATION METHODS 
As mentioned in Sections I and II, supra, it is important to find the right balance between sufficient privacy 
protection and satisfactory utility when developing a data perturbation approach to release information.  Different data 
perturbation approaches will lead to the various relationships between privacy and utility.41  The ideal case would be 
maximal utility plus minimal privacy, but this is unachievable in reality; the worst case, minimal utility plus maximal 
privacy, is unnecessary and defeats the purpose of data release and sharing.  Between the two extremes, there is a wide 
spectrum where data perturbation methods can be explored and developed.  The closer the curve is to the ideal case 
and the larger the area under the curve, the more efficient the corresponding perturbation approach is in protecting 
privacy yet achieving good utility. 
 
Figure 5: Pictorial representation of the privacy versus utility tradeoff.  Different solid lines represent different data perturbation 
approaches for releasing private information 
 
In the rest of this section, I will introduce some existing approaches for data perturbation, including their 
advantages and disadvantages.  Some of the methods are traditional and have existed for as long as almost half a 
century; others are relatively new and developed within the last decade in the DP framework.  
III.1. Traditional Approaches 
Data privacy protection in the statistical community has been known as statistical disclosure limitation or 
statistical disclosure control (SDL or SDC) for a long time.  The methods introduced in this subsection are the 
traditional approaches for privacy protection before the DP started to dominate the privacy research field.  Some of 
these SDC methods were documented in two major reports from the U.S. Federal Committee on Statistical 
Methodology in 197842 and 1994.43  Many of these long-existing techniques are still being employed today for 
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releasing data, largely owing to their simplicity and easy implementation.  These techniques can be roughly grouped 
into two categories: model-free and model-based approaches.  
Commonly used model-free approaches include global recoding, local suppression, micro-aggregation, data 
swapping, and post randomization (PRAM).  The first three approaches are not random and the information is 
suppressed in a deterministic way whereas the latter two methods are randomization mechanisms.  Global recoding 
coarsens sensitive information and groups individuals who are at higher risk of being identified and disclosed on their 
personal information.  For example, “annual income,” which is often viewed as sensitive personal information, can be 
coarsened to an ordinal variable (e.g. ≤$31K, $31K–$42K, $42K–$126K, $126K–$188K, >$188K) that is less 
sensitive.  Local suppression removes information that leads to either identification or disclosure of sensitive 
information in some records.  Though global recoding and local suppression provide protection, the incurred 
information loss can be large and the missing values created by local suppression impose an extra burden on data 
analysts.  Micro-aggregation aims at masking extreme values.44  It first defines buckets for the values of the attributes, 
then allocates individual records to these buckets and derives surrogate values for the attributes in each bucket.  To 
reduce information loss, individuals need to be as homogeneous as possible in each bucket in their attributes.  Since 
micro-aggregation acts more on outlying observations, disclosure risk may still exist for sensitive non-outlying cases.  
Data swapping switches quasi-identifiers45 among randomly picked individuals46 or among individuals within the 
same neighborhood defined based on the similarity of the values on the attribute to be swapped.47  Data swapping may 
lead to distorted relationships between swapped and non-swapped attributes.  Post Randomization (PRAM) is 
originally developed to transform values for categorical attributes,48 and the probabilities of transforming (e.g., from 
female to male, or the other way around) are stored in the “Markov probability matrix” or “transition matrix”.  PRAM 
is performed independently on each individual; and the information loss from PRAM can be large.  
Despite the simplicity of the model-free procedures, many of them do not ensure valid statistical inferences 
based on the perturbed data.  Not only are population parameters subject to bias, the uncertainty of these parameter 
estimates can be under- or over-estimates as well.  Model-based approaches can help to solve some of the issues, if 
applied in a proper way.  The model-based approaches often start with building a statistical model on the original data, 
from which synthetic data (basically predicted values from the model) are generated.  The synthetic data might include 
the whole data set to be released, or only sensitive attributes (such as sexual orientation or financial status) or quasi-
identifiers.  In the setting of sampling survey, Rubin proposes building a statistical model from the sample data, and 
predicting non-sampled values of survey variables for the individuals in the population where the sample is drawn.49  
The prediction and sampling can be repeated independently multiple times, and the multiple samples will be released 
to the public.  Little suggests synthesizing a part of the original data, specifically the values of sensitive attributes,50 
which is later extended to the values of quasi-identifiers.51  To fully account for the uncertainty of the synthetic data, 
the Bayesian framework is often used where the synthetic data are drawn from the posterior predictive distributions.  
If the synthesis model reflects the underlying unknown distribution that generates the original data, then the 
model-based approaches will lead to valid and more efficient statistical inferences given the synthetic data, compared 
to the model-free approaches.  On the other hand, if the synthesis model deviates from the underlying known 
distribution that generates the original data, then the synthetic data are not trustworthy.  In addition, developing 
statistical models for high-dimensional data can be very difficult, making it an inefficient approach for dealing with 
privacy in many situations in the big data era.  Since the synthetic data are generated from a statistical model, some 
perturbation is automatically incorporated with the uncertainty of the synthesis model as well as the sampling error 
from generating the synthetic data.  In addition, the synthetic values are not associated with any real individuals, they 
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are often regarded as providing privacy protection on the individuals who contribute their data in the original data; but 
a definitive assessment would be needed to quantify the safety level.  
III.2. The Need for New Approaches to Combat Contemporary Privacy Concerns  
Advances in analytical techniques and computation, together with the eruption of big data and real-time data 
collection and processing, can make the traditional methods for privacy protection ineffective.  In fact, there have been 
incidents of database reconstruction and individual identification from supposedly anonymized data.  Even if every 
individual piece of information is stripped of personal information, the relationships between the individual pieces 
can reveal the individual’s identity and a data intruder may still identify an individual in a data set via linkage with 
other public information.  Dinur and Nissim have documented this possibility in their seminal article52 and proved the 
“database reconstruction theorem,”53  also known as the “fundamental law of information recovery.”54 Some notable 
examples on individual identification breach in publicly released or restricted access data based on database 
reconstruction include the Netflix prize,55 the genotype and HapMap linkage effort,56 and the Washington State health 
record identification.57  The U.S. Census Bureau also provides convincing evidence on the need for a more rigorous 
privacy protection framework in the modern world.  Specifically, the Census Bureau conducted an internal experiment 
to reconstruct and re-identify the 2010 Census records based on the released 150 billion statistics on age, sex, race, 
ethnicity, and relationship (to householder) for about 309 million individuals.58  Note that the released statistics are 
already perturbed using some of the traditional techniques (e.g., global recoding, local suppression, and data 
swapping).  The findings are striking.  First, “census block and voting age (18+) were correctly reconstructed for all 
[309 million] records and for all 6,207,027 inhabited blocks.”59  Second, block, sex, age, race (OMB 63 categories), 
and ethnicity were reconstructed for 46% of the population (142 million individuals) and within one year for 71% of 
the population (219 million individuals).60  Third, applications of record-linkage techniques with external commercial 
data on block, sex, and age led to putative re-identification of 45% of the population (138 million individuals), and 
38% of the identifications (52 million individuals) are correct re-identifications.61 “The privacy law, in Title 13 of the 
United States Code, mandates that information about specific individuals, households and businesses is not revealed, 
even indirectly through our published statistics.”62 And the experiment results from the Census Bureau clearly show 
that the traditional disclosure avoidance methods are insufficient to counter the privacy risk.  
In summary, the new challenges posed by the current paradigm for data collection, analysis, and sharing call for 
more rigorous privacy concepts and frameworks.  Without knowing what intruders know and how powerful they are, 
privacy protection should aim at dealing with the worst-case scenarios.  In other words, the party who releases data 
should employ a framework that does not make ad-hoc and strong assumptions on how much background information 
intruders possess, and what algorithms or techniques intruders use to identify individuals, calculate sensitive 
information, or re-construct a database, given the released data.  DP fits the description of such a framework.  As 
mentioned in Section I.2.3, the U.S. Census Bureau is one of the organizations that have decided to adopt DP to 
guarantee formal privacy to meet its continuing obligations to safeguard respondent information.63  Specifically, the 
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results from the 2020 census will be published using differentially private mechanisms.  As an experiment, it applied 
the DP mechanism that it will implement (subject to modifications and changes) on the 2020 census to the 2010 
census, and the re-identification risk lowered to 0 at privacy budget ε = 0 (as expected), 3% at ε = 2, 4.5% at ε = 4, 
6% at ε = 8, and 8.2% at ε = 16.  The decreases in the privacy risk are very significant compared to the traditional 
privacy protection techniques.  
III.3. Differential Privacy Based Approaches 
Many approaches and randomization mechanisms have been developed to achieve DP guarantee for released 
information.  Some of them do not target specific statistics or analyses, such as the Laplace mechanism,64 the Gaussian 
mechanism for releasing numerical data,65 and the Exponential mechanism66 that can release both numerical and 
categorical data.  Differentially private versions of many common statistical analyses and machine learning techniques 
have also been proposed in the past decade, ranging from simple analyses such as releasing histograms and summary 
statistics, to common regression models,67 to principle component analysis,68 to regularized empirical risk 
minimization,69 to deep learning,70 among others.  Releasing one private statistic or a limited set of private results as 
the interactive query-based data release from the data curator who has access to the original data has drawbacks.  
Specifically, the requirement to pre-specify the level of privacy budget often dictates the number and the types of 
future queries with the privacy budget parallel composition theorem,71 which means that every time the same set of 
data is queried, there is a privacy cost.  Since the overall privacy cost is the sum of all the privacy budgets spent on 
releasing all queries from that data set, if the sum exceeds the pre-set overall privacy budget, the curator will refuse to 
answer any further queries.  It would be great if data users had direct access to the differentially private individual-
level data that are of the same structure as the original data to perform any analysis as if they had the original data.   
The DP framework for releasing differentially private individual-level data, is referred to as Differentially 
Private Data Synthesis (DIPS).  Efforts have been made to advance the techniques on DIPS.  Some DIPS techniques 
focus on generating differentially private distributions from which synthetic data can be sampled without imposing 
assumptions on the distribution of the original data.  Other approaches first build a model on the original data, by 
consuming a portion of the privacy budget, and then generate synthetic data from the constructed model.  Though only 
a fraction of the privacy budget is allocated for data synthesis per se compared to the model-free approaches which 
use all the budget to generate synthetic data, the benefits of using a well-specified model to generate synthetic data 
may outweigh the budget splitting between model selection and data synthesis.  DIPS approaches to dealing with 
 
64. Dwork et al., supra note 5. 
65. Cynthia Dwork & Aaron Roth, The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy, 9 FOUND. & TRENDS THEORETICAL COMPUTER 
SCI. 211, 211–407 (2014); Fang Liu, Generalized Gaussian Mechanism for Differential Privacy, 31 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE & DATA 
ENGINEERING, 747, 747–56 (2019). 
66. Frank McSherry & Kunal Talwar, Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy, in 48 ANNUAL IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON FOUNDATIONS OF 
COMPUTER SCIENCE PROCEEDINGS 94, 94–103 (2007). 
67. Adam Smith, Efficient, Differentially Private Point Estimators (Sept. 27, 2008) (unpublished), https://arxiv.org/pdf/0809.4794.pdf; Duy 
Vu & Aleksandra Slavković, Differential Privacy for Clinical Trial Data: Preliminary Evaluations, in 9 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
DATA MINING PROCEEDINGS 138, 138–43 (2009).  
68. Cynthia Dwork et al., Analyze Gauss: Optimal Bounds for Privacy-Preserving Principal Component Analysis, in 46 ANNUAL ACM 
SYMPOSIUM ON THEORY OF COMPUTING PROCEEDINGS 11, 11–20 (2014); Kamalika Chaudhuri, Anand Sarwate & Kaushik Sinha, Near-Optimal 
Differentially Private Principal Components, in 25 ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 
(2012). 
69. Chaudhuri, Monteleoni & Sarwate, supra note 39; Kifer, Smith & Thakurta, supra note 39. 
70. Reza Shokri & Vitaly Shmatikov, Privacy-Preserving Deep Learning, in 22 ACM SIGSAC CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND 
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY PROCEEDINGS 1310, 1310–21 (2015); Martín Abadi et al., Deep Learning with Differential Privacy, in 23 ACM 
SIGSAC CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY PROCEEDINGS 308, 308–18 (2016); Briland Hitaj, Giuseppe Ateniese & 
Fernando Perez-Cruz, Deep Models Under the GAN: Information Leakage from Collaborative Deep Learning, in 24 ACM SIGSAC CONFERENCE 
ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY PROCEEDINGS 603, 603–18 (2017). 
71. Frank McSherry, Privacy Integrated Queries: An Extensible Platform for Privacy-Preserving Data Analysis, in 35 ACM SIGMOD 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT OF DATA PROCEEDINGS 19, 19–30 (2009). 
special types of data have also been developed, such as graphs and networks,72  and mobility data from GPS 
trajectories.73  Interested readers may refer to Bowen and Liu74 for a more comprehensive overview on DIPS methods.   
It is worth noting that the National Institute of Standards and Technology sponsored the Differential Privacy 
Synthetic Data Challenge in 2018, encouraging development of new methods and improving existing DIPS methods 
for releasing data, while preserving the dataset’s utility for analysis.75  This competition encourages in-demand work 
and promotes efforts that help transition from the theoretical work to the practical applications in the area of DP. 
IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
The world is in the middle of a data and technology revolution.  Today’s sophisticated computer technology and 
the increasing data collection and information access have equipped data intruders with more tools to launch privacy 
attacks successfully.  Confidentiality is vital for the future cooperation of individual data contributors and collection 
of high-quality data to guide policy makers, industries, and businesses to make efficient and timely evidence-based 
decisions.   
Research and practical applications on data privacy have been gaining momentum in recent years.  Great progress 
has been made on the theories and methods in data perturbation, the evaluation of the impact of data perturbation on 
utility, information loss, statistical inference, and privacy risk measures.  In the last decade, DP has been dominating 
the research on data privacy and there is no sign of slowing down.  In addition, practical applications of DP and open-
source codes for implementation have started to catch up in recent years.  Compared to other parameterized or absolute 
privacy risk measures, DP does not impose strong assumptions on, or model, data intruder’s behavior and external 
knowledge.  As such, it is robust, immune to post-processing, and future-proof.  In other words, data intruders cannot 
gain additional information about his target from released differentially private information no matter what he does to 
the released information and no matter how much future information he will obtain.  These powerful properties of DP 
and the associated potentials for practical implementation are the key reasons for attracting attention from researchers 
and practitioners alike. 
Big companies such as Google and Apple, and more recently Facebook, have pioneered the implementation of 
DP techniques in data collection and analysis, the descriptions of which can be easily found online.  Online technology 
news media and blogs (e.g. Wired, AdExchangers, CNET, Science, TechRepublic, Tech Chums) have been closely 
following the moves and updates regarding the implementation of the DP-related technology in industry and business.  
Open-source codes have also been made public through GitHub (hosting software development and version control).  
Despite all the publicity and actual deployment, the DP systems implemented by some of the companies are still 
subject to conceptual and technical flaws.  For example, it is suggested the privacy-loss budget employed by Apple to 
collect users’ data on mobile devices is too high to be acceptable for privacy protection.76  To gain the trust of 
consumers who opt to share their data, companies should continually improve their DP systems and models and make 
sure the privacy risk of their consumers can be controlled at the pre-specified level. 
The government agencies, who collect huge amounts of data every year through surveys and who are obligated 
to share the collected information with taxpayers, should also consider making a transition to apply data perturbation 
approaches with stricter privacy protection.  It is not an easy task to make such a transition, as many government 
agencies have been using the traditional data perturbation approaches for a very long time.  In addition, there are no 
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documented cases and minimal complaints regarding the privacy risk on the information shared by the government 
agencies over the years, providing few rationales and very weak motivation on the adoption of more formal privacy 
concept, such as DP.  The decision of the U.S. Census Bureau of applying DP in the 2020 Census had occupied some 
headline news since the official announcement in 2018 and has made many ears prick up.  “[C]ritics of the new policy 
believe the Census Bureau is moving too quickly to fix a system that isn’t broken.  They also fear the changes will 
degrade the quality of the information used by thousands of researchers, businesses, and government agencies.”77  It 
is argued that database reconstruction, similar to what the Census Bureau has experimented with, have been 
exaggerated, and the DP approach is inconsistent with the statutory obligations, history, and core mission of the Census 
Bureau.78  I would argue that the DP approach adopted by the Census Bureau might seem like overprotection for the 
present, but the privacy protection offered by DP covers the worst-case scenario and is future-proof.  This is very 
important as no one can predict what the future is like for certain.  In addition,  if the DP strategies adopted by the 
Census Bureau on the 2020 census turn out to yield useless data (which is very unlikely) by injecting too perturbation 
for privacy purposes, the Census Bureau could always fall back on the traditional ways of releasing data, without 
losing much in either privacy or utility, except for the resources or manpower devoted to the DP project.  
Despite the rapid growth in the field of DP, issues and opportunities in research and applications exist.  The field 
of DP has witnessed a huge jump in the number of manuscripts in recent years.  Papers on DP were published quickly 
due to its popularity at the expense of quality.  For example, there have been cases where a published manuscript 
claims satisfaction of a certain 𝜖𝜖-level, but the actual privacy cost is much higher; or, two manuscripts discuss the 
same topic, but draw conflicting conclusions.79  Peer-reviewed journals and conferences will need to better police the 
research on data privacy, especially on DP.  
I list below some potential areas in DP and data privacy in general that will benefit from more work and further 
research.  First, more work is needed to test the scalability and feasibility of the developed DP methods in practice.  
Though many published DP techniques share empirical evidence on their potentials for practical implementation by 
running experiments and tests on publicly available data, many of the employed data are a “nice” subset with 
significantly fewer attributes than the raw data, or pre-processed by removing hard-to-deal problems, such as cases 
with missing values.  The “real” real-life data can be much nastier and messier than those used by researchers in their 
manuscripts.  Not only are there missing values, data entry errors, and outliers, but also data might exhibit correlation 
and the dimensionality can be huge (number of attributes in the hundreds or thousands).  In the case of survey data, 
complex survey designs and weighting schemes might be used, which cannot be ignored when performing analysis.  
Improvement and extension of available approaches and development of new methods should be able to handle these 
real-life challenges as much as possible.  Second, easy-to-use, user-friendly, and computationally-cheap software and 
tools to implement data perturbation with a guarantee of formal privacy and to measure data utility are still in great 
need.  Without proper tools developed and deployed in time to facilitate application, the excitement about a new 
approach or technique will soon disappear and be abandoned by practitioners quickly.  Third, most research on privacy 
in computer science focuses on prediction and might not be easily extendable to private statistical inferences.  
Statisticians and computer scientists should work together to provide effective solutions to this problem.  Fourth, if a 
parameterized privacy protection technique is used, choosing appropriate hyper-parameters (both privacy and 
accuracy parameters) is critical.  In the case of DP, there is still no consensus on the appropriate amount of the privacy 
budget for practical use.  Even with the 2020 Census just around the corner, the Census Bureau is still searching for a 
suitable privacy budget for the 2020 census.  Finally, there is an urgent need to educate the public on what DP is, 
especially if it will be widely used for collecting and releasing data in the near future.  Efforts have been made.  For 
example, the YouTube video “Protecting Privacy with MATH,” a collaboration between minute physics and the 
Census Bureau, posted on September 12, 2019, has had 334,290 views as of March 9, 2020.80  The American Statistical 
Association Committee on Privacy and Confidentiality, which I am part of, regularly invites speakers to talk about 
DP through webinars on Data Privacy day, which offers free registration to the public.  The fact that household-name 
big companies employ DP in data collection and release and that the Census Bureau will use DP for releasing 2020 
Census data have helped grab some people’s attention to DP.  Despite all these efforts, there are still confusions about 
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what formal privacy means, not only among the public, but also among researchers who are not specialized in privacy 
research.  Industries, government agencies, and researchers who are adopting DP or conducting research in DP should 
make more efforts to reach out to the public on the increase in privacy risk that is largely due to the collection of big 
data and recent technical advances, the state-of-art privacy research, the techniques that can help combat the new 
privacy threats, and the importance and necessity of continuing data collection and sharing under the formal privacy 
guarantee.   
In summary, to help people to exercise their right to privacy, policy makers, legislators, industries and 
businesses, academia and research institutes, and individuals/consumers will need to work together to achieve that 
goal.  It is not an easy task, but something has to be done not only for ourselves, but also for many generations to 
come. 
 
